The basic reproduction number, R 0 , of an infectious agent is a key factor determining the rate of spread and the proportion of the host population a¡ected. We formulate a general mathematical framework to describe the transmission dynamics of long incubation period diseases with complex pathogenesis. This is used to derive expressions for R 0 of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in British cattle, and backcalculation methods are used to estimate R 0 throughout the time-course of the BSE epidemic. We show that the 1988 meat and bonemeal ban was e¡ective in rapidly reducing R 0 below 1, and demonstrate that this indicates that BSE will be unable to become endemic in the UK cattle population even when case clustering is taken into account. The analysis provides some insight into absolute infectiousness for bovine-to-bovine transmission, indicating maximally infectious animals may have infected up to 400 animals each. The relationship between R 0 and the early stages of the BSE epidemic and the requirements for additional research are also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Over 172 000 con¢rmed cases of BSE had been reported in British cattle by January 1998. Whilst the e¡ect of the epidemic on animal health and European agriculture has been severe, greatest concern now centres around the potential implications for human health, given evidence supporting a link between BSE and a new variant of Creutzfeldt^Jakob Disease (vCJD) in humans (Collinge et al. 1996; Bruce et al. 1997; Hill et al. 1997) .
It is particularly important to public health and agricultural policy makers to establish that BSE in Great Britain (GB) is in permanent decline, and that no potential exists for the disease to persist endemically via direct horizontal and vertical transmission within the GB cattle herd. Such epidemiological considerations will directly a¡ect decisions on the relaxation of the export ban on GB cattle and measures to limit human exposure to potentially infected animals (including the ban on the consumption of beef from older animals and the ban on beef on the bone). The fundamental epidemiological quantity determining whether an infectious disease will persist in a host population is the basic reproduction number, R 0 (Anderson & May 1991) . This is de¢ned as the expected number of secondary infections caused in an entirely susceptible population by a typical infected host. R 0 is a key factor in determining how fast an infection will spread in a population previously unexposed to that pathogen, and the total proportion of the population which will be infected once the infection becomes endemic. If R 0 41, the infectious agent has the potential to persist inde¢nitely, whilst if R 0 51, the incidence of infection will decay to zero. The reason is clear: if any one primary infection is unable to generate at least one replacement secondary infection, the numbers of infected hosts in the population will inevitably decline through time.
This paper represents the most comprehensive analysis to date estimating R 0 for BSE from the case data (but see . For many models of human diseases, R 0 is often assumed to be unchanging through time, though long-term changes in human demography mobility and behaviour (Anderson & May 1991; Noin & Woods 1993 ) make this approximation invalid over time-scales of more than a few decades. R 0 for BSE is likely to have changed dramatically in value throughout the course of the epidemic, however, due to various interventions designed to halt transmission. The route of transmission was also unusual, namely through the recycling of infectious bovine tissues back into bovine feed via the rendering and feed manufacturing industries. Changes in the feed industry (Wilesmith et al. 1991) are therefore also likely to have had considerable and rapid e¡ects on the e¤ciency of transmission and hence R 0 .
Much research e¡ort is being directed towards estimating the potential magnitude of the past exposure of the human population to infectious material. However, the uncertainties in key epidemiological parameters are currently too large to allow precise risk assessment. In particular, very little information is available on the infectiousness of infected bovine tissues to humans and the incubation period of vCJD. Much of the limited information currently available is derived from studies using bovine, mouse or primate animal models (Fraser et al. 1992; Lasmezas et al. 1996; Wells et al. 1998) . This paper sheds further light on the e¤ciency of the bovine-tobovine infection process (and thereby within-species infectiousness), by calculating the expected number of infections, caused by an infected animal at a particular point in its incubation period, needed to produce a BSE epidemic consistent with the reported case data. We show that such estimates (together with estimates of R 0 itself ) are highly dependent on assumptions made about how the infectivity of a¡ected tissues increases as the disease progresses. In particular, if infectivity is mainly con¢ned to the end of the incubation period (as is suggested, though not proven, by interim results from a study of BSE pathogenesis in cattle (Dawson et al. 1990; Wells et al. 1994 Wells et al. , 1998 ), the absolute infectiousness of such animals is shown to have been very high to generate the observed epidemic. This reinforces the results from the continuing oral dosing studies of cattle (Anderson et al. 1996) which suggest that an LD 50 dose of less than 1g of brain homogenate is needed for bovine-to-bovine transmission via oral exposure.
Even allowing for a substantial species barrier reducing the e¤ciency of transmission from bovines to humans, this analysis has implications for vCJD risk assessment: if all BSE-infected animals were equally infectious, the temporal pattern of human exposure would have closely tracked the epidemic of new infections in cattle (Anderson et al. 1996) , with exposure peaking in 19899 0ölargely prior to the introduction of the`speci¢ed bovine o¡al' (SBO) ban introduced to protect human health (Bovine O¡al Regulations 1989) . If, however, signi¢cant infectivity were only found in late-incubationstage animals, human exposure would have tracked BSE case incidence, peaking in 1992^93öafter the SBO ban.
The origins of the BSE epidemic in GB are the subject of much speculation at the moment (BSE Inquiry 1998; Dickson 1998) . The analyses presented here shed some additional light on this topic, by addressing the question of the type and timing of infection source which would have been required to start the epidemic in a manner consistent with a relatively constant value of R 0 in the earliest stage of the epidemic. We discuss when a singlè cross-over' event (from sheep scrapie, for instance) might have occurred, together with the hypothesis that some low-level external source of infection (from a sporadic bovine spongiform encephalopathy) acted over several years to generate the epidemic. The uncertainties surrounding the origin of BSE and the need for additional research are highlighted.
METHODS
We use the backcalculation model described in earlier papers (Anderson et al. 1996; Ferguson et al. 1997) to estimate the infection hazard (or`force of infection') for BSE experienced by GB cattle between 1980 and 1996. This, together with a model for the infectivity of cattle as a function of incubation stage, is then used to estimate the transmission coe¤cient of BSE through the feed-borne route, F , and so the basic reproduction number via that route, R FF 0 . We follow the notation used in Ferguson et al. (1997) .
Unlike our earlier backcalculation studies, estimation of R 0 requires explicit consideration of the infectivity recycling (`feedback') process that gave rise to the BSE epidemic, not just estimation of a past temporal trend of infection hazard (feed risk). More precisely, we explore epidemic models which are capable of reproducing the force of infection estimates generated by the backcalculation model. One aim of this work is to introduce to a wider community than hitherto the methodology required for modelling long (non-exponentially distributed) incubation period diseases with potentially complex relationships between incubation stage and infectiousness (sheep scrapie (Woolhouse et al. 1998 ) is another example). The analysis presented below is therefore made as general (and thus widely applicable to other disease systems) as possible; a more mathematically rigorous discussion of the derivation of R 0 for structured populations can be found in a variety of other papers (Diekmann et al. 1990; Heesterbeek & Dietz 1996) .
(a) The epidemic model Let Q (t,a) be the total infection hazard experienced at time t by susceptible hosts of age a, and p I (t 0 ,a) be the probability that an animal born at time t 0 is infected by age a, in the absence of mortality. Then dp I (t 0 ,a) da
Note that this equation has the solution
In general, Q (t,a) is made up of contributions from multiple transmission routesöfeed-borne (F), maternal (M) and direct horizontal (H ): i.e. Q (t,a) iF,M,H Q i (t,a). Let us now consider the form of the hazard function for the direct horizontal transmission route, postponing consideration of agedependent susceptibility. The hazard at any time t is proportional to the fraction of animals alive at that time which are infected, weighted by the relative infectivity of those animals and the transmission coe¤cient through the horizontal route:
Here, n(t,a H ) is the density of hosts of age a H in the population at time t, such that N(t) I 0 n(t,a H )da H is the total population size at time t, H (t) is the transmission coe¤cient for horizontal transmission from a maximally infectious host at time t, 2 H (() is the relative infectivity (here standardized to have a maximum value of 1) of a host at time ( after infection, and p H I dp I (t 0 ,a)ada, the probability density function (PDF) for infection at age a, for an animal born at time t 0 . p H I can also be thought of as the age-speci¢c per-capita incidence of infection for hosts born at time t 0 .
This form of infection hazard assumes`mass-action' mixing (De Jong et al. 1995) , namely that the infection hazard experienced by any host is proportional to the proportion of all contacts that are with infectious animals, and that animals of all ages mix homogeneously. The latter assumption means that the infection hazard experienced by any individual is proportional to the fraction of the population which is infectious. This explains the origin of the N(t) denominator in equation (3). Massaction implies global mixing of all cattle feed, with infectivity being evenly distributed within the feed. } 3 discusses the e¡ect of relaxing this assumption (see also Hagenaars et al. 1999) .
Note that n(t,a H ) is given by
where B(t 0 ) is the birth rate of cattle at time t 0 , and S(a H ,t 0 ) is the probability that a bovine born at time t 0 survives to age a H . For later ease of notation we de¢ne the PDF for the age, a H , of animals alive at time t to be
We can now express p H I (t) in terms of the infection hazard experience prior to time t. From equation (2),
In the absence of transmission routes other than horizontal, putting equations (3) and (6) together gives an integral equation for the time evolution of the infection hazard:
Whilst this equation can be rewritten as a set of time-delayed partial di¡erential equations, we prefer the above form due to its simple interpretation in terms of`generations' of infections and its easy application to backcalculation analysis. In the simple case of 2 H (() e À(aT , an exponentially distributed infectious period, this equation can be reduced to the simple Kermack & McKendrick SI (susceptible^infected) model (Kermack & McKendrick 1927; Anderson & May 1991) . However, for BSE, the relationship between the infection hazard, Q , and the pro¢le of infection prevalence in the host population, p I , is considerably more complex than for the simple SI model. We need to allow for age-dependent susceptibility to infection, which gives
where g H (a) is the relative susceptibility of an animal of age a. We can write this as
Note that our ability to separate the age-and time-varying components of the infection hazard in equation (9) considerably simpli¢es the following analysis.
A very similar expression to equation (8) is obtained for the feed-based and maternal transmission route hazards, Q F and
Here, r i (t) is given by
where we have used the i subscript to signify potentially routedependent parameters. ' F (t,a) is the PDF of the age at slaughter for animals slaughtered at time t,
whilst ' M (t,a) is the PDF of the age at calving of dams giving birth at time t,
This latter equation assumes only animals over two years of age produce o¡spring, and that the great majority of animals over two years of age are female. It should be noted that all the above expressions for infection hazards via di¡erent transmission routes assume animals are only infectious prior to disease onset. For feed-based transmission this is an approximation, especially in the early years of the epidemic, since it is likely that many of the carcasses of undiagnosed/unreported cases may have been recycled for animal feed, even if not passed ¢t for human consumption. We do not present here the more complicated expressions for the feed-based hazard, including recycling of non-reported cases, but the e¡ect of including such a term is discussed in more detail at the end of } 3c.
Note that, given estimates of r F (t) (termed the`feed risk pro¢le' in Anderson et al. (1996) and Ferguson et al. (1997) ) and 2 F ((), equations (11) and (6) allow F (t) to be estimated:
However, if one assumes that infectivity peaks at the onset of clinical symptoms, it is useful to specify infectivity in terms of the time remaining until clinical onset of BSE, rather than in terms of the time since infection. De¢ning O i (#) to be the infectivity at time # prior to disease onset, 2 i (() is obtained by convoluting O(#) with the incubation period distribution PDF, f i (u):
For the simple Kermack & McKendrick SI model with exponentially distributed infectious period and time-invariant transmission coe¤cient, R 0 T, where T is the mean infectious period. Variants of this form of R 0 are applicable for the vast majority of epidemic models in use today (Anderson & May 1991) . However, the time-varying nature of the transmission coe¤cient, the complex (non-exponential) infectious and incubation period distributions, and age-dependency in susceptibility to infection make derivation of R 0 more complex for BSE. The key to the analysis is the procedure used to average over all possible primary and secondary infection types. By infectioǹ type', we mean the age of the animal at infection, the time of infection and the route through which infection occurred.
It is also important to de¢ne what is meant by the time, t, at which an estimate R 0 (t) is made. In the mathematical derivation which follows we use the most straightforward and commonly used de¢nition, where t is the time of infection of the primary host. However, since the majority of animals in the BSE epidemic were infected via consumption of dead animal tissue, this de¢nition can give somewhat non-intuitive results, since the value of R 0 at time t then corresponds to infections occurring at time t 2 years or later (given that most animals are infected in the ¢rst year of life, and are slaughtered at two years of age or later). We therefore extend our derivation to de¢ne R 0 (t s ), where t s represents the date of slaughter of the primary infection, as t s is more temporally correlated with the generation of secondary infections. We then use this form when presenting the results of our analyses.
Note also that in this paper we are de¢ning R 0 in terms of the numbers of secondary infections caused by a primary infection, rather than the cases per case de¢nition used for direct horizontal transmission in Ferguson et al. (1997) . Both de¢nitions give the same values of R 0 in the case of non-varying transmission coe¤cients and for the maternal or direct horizontal transmission routes, but the case-per-case de¢nition is rather counter-intuitive for the feed-borne route, since only animals slaughtered prior to identi¢cation as a BSE suspect were able to infect other animals through that route.
In determining the age distribution of primary infections through transmission route i (where i F,M,H), we assume that the entire population alive at time t is subject to an in¢nite-simal infection hazard. In the absence of mortality, the age distribution of primary infections will just be given by the relative susceptibility^exposure of an animal of age a, g(a) (normalized to be a PDF over the lifespan of the host). Allowing for mortality, the age distribution at time t is given by
We then consider one host drawn from this distribution infecting another host at time t ( through transmission route j. The probability that this event occurs is the product of various elements: the probability that the primary infection will survive to age a ( (for horizontal or maternal transmission routes) or be slaughtered at age a ( (for the feed-based transmission route), given that the animal survived to age a; the proportion of alive, or dead (depending on transmission route), hosts at time t ( represented by this one infected animal (this is required because, under the mass-action formulation, infection hazard is proportional to the fraction of hosts infected); the transmission coe¤cient via route j; the relative infectiousness via route j of an animal at time ( after infection (assumed here to be independent of the route by which the primary case was infected); the susceptibility of secondary hosts of age a H ; the number of hosts of age a H at time t (. Symbolically, for the direct horizontal transmission route ( j H) this is expressed as
Using equations (5) and (16), this can be rewritten in the form
where W i (t) is de¢ned as
More generally, for primary infections via transmission route i, and secondary infections through route j, R ij 0 can be shown to be given by
Note that, if the birth rate, B(t), and survivorship, S(a,t 0 ), are independent of time, the expression for R ii 0 simpli¢es to the type of expression given in Heesterbeek & Dietz (1996) :
Given the three potential transmission routes of BSE, we have been left with a 3 Â3 matrix of R ij 0 values. In this situation, the global R 0 value obtained by`averaging' over transmission routes is given by the dominant eigenvalue of the R ij 0 matrix (Heesterbeek & Dietz 1996) . This is the same procedure as is used when calculating R 0 for any system with discrete heterogeneity and between-class mixing (e.g. discrete age-structure in childhood disease models or sexual activity classes in sexually transmitted disease models (Anderson & May 1991) ). In essence, the dominant eigenvalue corresponds to the multiplication factor seen between adjacent generations of infection for the (quasistationary) growth of an epidemic in an in¢nite host population.
It is also worth noting that we have adopted the simplifying assumption above that the infectiousness through route j at time ( after infection, 2 j ((), is independent of the route by which that animal was itself infected. Given equation (15), this implicitly assumes that the incubation period of BSE does not depend on the route of infection. Comparing the limited data from the MAFF maternal cohort study Donnelly et al. 1997c; Curnow et al. 1997; Gore et al. 1997) with data from the BSE case database, there is no evidence of a signi¢cant di¡er-ence in incubation periods by likely infection route, but the limited sample size and confounding factors mean this possibility cannot be excluded. However, given the low estimated probability of maternal transmission, any such e¡ect will, in any case, have a neglible impact on the transmission dynamics of the pathogen.
Up until now, our derivations of R ij 0 (t) have de¢ned t to be the time at which the primary case was infected. De¢ning an R ij 0 (t s ) where t s is the time of slaughter of the primary infection is straightforward in the case j F, since secondary infection can only occur on the death of the primary infected animal:
It is more complex to change time coordinates in the case of maternal or direct horizontal secondary infections, however, and so we omit the details here. Lastly, it will prove informative to examine the average number of secondary infections caused (in an entirely susceptible population) by one maximally infectious (i.e. 2 F (() 1) animal which is slaughtered prior to disease onset, I iF (t s ):
RESULTS
We focus on the feed-borne transmission route alone in presenting these results: analyses of the MAFF maternal cohort study Donnelly et al. 1997c; Curnow et al. 1997; Gore et al. 1997) , and of dam^calf pairs in the BSE database (Donnelly et al. 1997a) , indicate maternal transmission occurs at a rate that will contribute negligibly (50X01) to the total R 0 value for BSE. The potential for direct horizontal transmission (for which no evidence exists) to enable persistence of BSE has already been discussed in Ferguson et al. (1997) , where an upper bound of R HH 0 0X15 was estimated. We use a re¢ned version of the backcalculation model of Ferguson et al. (1997) 1980) , to obtain estimates of r F (t) whilst exploring a variety of infectivity assumptions (which determine the form of 2 F (() ). The baseline estimates are shown in ¢gure 1. The parametric and functional assumptions used in deriving these estimates are described in detail in Ferguson et al. (1997) , but it is relevant to repeat here that we only allow for underreporting prior to mid-1988, the time when BSE became a noti¢able disease.
Our principal aim here is to demonstrate how di¡erent assumptions about the relative infectivity of cattle at di¡erent incubation stages a¡ect our estimates of R 0 and related quantities, and the implications of these results. We present results from two infectivity models. The ¢rst assumes infectivity rises exponentially throughout the incubation period, with a growth coe¤cient of two per year (i.e. O F (#) e À2# ). Given the equivalent interpretation of 1 À O F # as the cumulative distribution function for the duration of infectiousness, this model corresponds to a mean duration of infectiousness of six months at the end of the incubation period. The second model assumes animals are equally infectious throughout their incubation period (O(#) 1, for 0 4 # 4 a max , and O(#) 0, for # b a max , where a max is the maximum lifespan of an animal).
These models are chosen as representing epidemiological extremes, in the sense that intermediate models (e.g. exponential growth of infectivity, with a growth rate of 0.5 per year) give epidemiological estimates (e.g. of R 0 ) that lie between those obtained from these scenarios. Similarly, if one scales the mean duration of infectiousness below six months, R 0 estimates are correspondingly increased. It should also be noted that whilst an exponential is used here, the results are relatively insensitive to the function form of O(#): assuming a step function (zero infectivity until the last six months of incubation, and constant infectivity thereafter) gives very similar results. A six-month mean infectious period was chosen for the ¢rst model as being most consistent with current experimental data on BSE pathogenesis (Wells et al. 1998) , results from the BSE maternal cohort study Donnelly et al. 1997c; Curnow et al. 1997; Gore et al. 1997) , and analysis of dam^calf pairs in the BSE case database (Donnelly et al. 1997a) . The pathogenesis data suggest that infectivity titres in central nervous system tissues grow rapidly in the last few months of incubation, whilst the latter analysis indicates that the enhanced risk of BSE experienced by the o¡spring of BSE a¡ected dams also increases dramatically in the last stages of the maternal incubation periodösuggesting a corresponding increase in infectious titres in that period. Anderson et al. (1996) and Ferguson et al. (1997) inevitably send R 0 3 0 in August 1996, by assuming enhanced implementation of control measures would have meant r F (t) was zero after that time. Prior to 1989, the higher values of R 0 seen under the ¢rst infectivity scenario (¢gure 2a) are due to the increased`generation time' between infections under that model: when infectivity is restricted to the end of the incubation period, the average time between an animal being infected and when it infects other animals is in the order of ¢ve years (the mean incubation period of BSE), whilst if animals are equally infectious throughout the incubation period, this time is around one to two years (most animals are slaughtered at around two years of age). Figure 2c ,d shows the e¡ect of relaxing our previous assumption that infected animals were only recycled into ruminant-based meat and bonemeal (MBM) if they were slaughtered prior to the onset of symptoms. By de¢nition, the heads (and, after mid-1988, the whole carcasses) of diagnosed BSE cases were never recycled, since the basis of diagnosis was always neuropathological examination at the UK Central Veterinary Laboratory. However, it is unclear what proportion of carcasses from non-reported BSE cases were processed in the usual way by feed mills or abbatoirs. For that reason, the estimates shown in ¢gure 2c,d were derived using models that assumed all non-reported BSE cases were processed for MBM, and that such animals were maximally infectious. It can be seen that R 0 estimates are fairly insensitive to this assumption, for the reasons discussed in } 3b.
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Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1999) Figure 1 . Backcalculation model estimates of feed^risk pro¢le, r F (t) from 1980^1993, calculated from a model with no horizontal or maternal transmission, or`external' infection hazard. Estimates of r F (t) prior to 1980 are not signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero.
The temporal trends in R 0 revealed by ¢gure 2 are broadly consistent with a relatively unchanging epidemic process (roughly constant R 0 ) prior to the introduction of the ban on the use of MBM in feed (BSE Order 1988)ö at least for the exponentially increasing infectivity modelöthen with a dramatic fall in the e¤ciency of feed-borne transmission. That stated, the £uctuations seen in R 0 prior to 1988 are signi¢cant, even allowing that the con¢dence limits shown are narrower than those which would be obtained from a (computationally infeasible) calculation of the full multivariate con¢dence region around the best-¢t point of the backcalculation model (see Ferguson et al. (1997) for details of how con¢-dence limits are calculated). In particular, the dip in R 0 seen in 1985^1986 requires explanation, especially for the model assuming constant infectivity throughout the incubation period. This will probably only be found from analyses of BSE transmission dynamics which examine transmission heterogeneityöin particular, case clustering at the herd level (Donnelly et al. 1997b and potential spatial processes underlying epidemic spread.
Under both infectivity models, R 0 falls dramatically following the introduction of the ruminant feed ban in 1988 (BSE Order 1988) , dropping to below 1 by 1990, and below 0.5 by 1993. Indeed, for the more realistic infectivity model (¢gure 2a), R 0`0 X15 in 1993. This is the same bound as was found in the analysis of potential direct horizontal transmission in Ferguson et al. (1997) . In that analysis, when R HH 0 9 0X15, virtually all transmission in 1993 was estimated to have been through that routeö i.e. even when multiple transmission routes are allowed for, the maximum bound on the total R 0 value was approximately 0.15 in 1993.
These estimates of R 0 suggest that BSE will not become endemic in the UK. Again, however, it should be remembered that the models used assume homogeneous mixing of cattle and cattle feed in the UK. To what extent might heterogeneity in transmission provide a mechanism allowing pockets of R 0 b 1 transmission to remain? Under the hypothesis that only a closed subpopulation of the UK cattle herd was ever exposed to infected MBM (and thereby reducing the e¡ective population size within which the epidemic occurred), estimated R 0 values change little. Similarly, if one makes the reasonable assumption that the e¡ect of the MBM was not to lower infectivity in that MBM which was still being produced, but to reduce the proportion of the cattle population exposed, the only way in which R 0 might remain above 1 in that exposed subpopulation would be if the recycling process was entirely local: e.g. if the MBM consumed by cattle in one holding was manufactured from cattle in that holding. Under this, or most other scenarios in which a subpopulation is su¡ering BSE transmission with R 0 b 1, one would have expected to see an increase in the degree of case clustering (Donnelly et al. 1997b following the MBM ban. However, statistical analysis of clustering at the herd level has so far failed to reveal any signi¢cant di¡erence between the degree of clustering seen before and after the MBM ban (Donnelly et al. 1997b) . (b) Infectiousness of cattle through the feed-borne transmission route Figure 3a ,b shows estimated annual averages of I FF , the expected number of infections per maximally infectious primary infection slaughtered in an entirely susceptible population. As expected, for the model in which infectivity is assumed to be constant throughout the incubation period (¢gure 3b), I
FF is very similar in value to R 0 , the slight di¡erence being because the calculation of R 0 allows for the proportion (around 20%) of animals which develop BSE symptoms prior to slaughter not being recycled as MBM. However, under the assumption that infectivity is greatest at the end of the incubation period, I
FF is much larger than R 0 . This is because under this infectivity scenario, the`typical primary infection' (i.e. an animal slaughtered several years prior to disease onset) has a very low probability of infecting other animals, meaning that the small proportion of cattle which survive to be slaughtered just prior to the onset of symptoms need to generate very large numbers of infections per capita in order to reproduce the growth rate seen in the BSE epidemic. Indeed, the numbers are su¤ciently large to imply that feed-based transmission was a highly e¤cient transmission route, assuming (from ongoing experimental studies of the oral susceptibility of cattle (Anderson et al. 1996) ) that the oral LD 50 of brain homogenate for cattle is, say, ca. 0.1g, and given the inevitable dilution of brain material that must have occurred in the feed manufacturing process.
The di¡erences in I FF under these two pathogenesis scenarios re£ect the fact that a ¢xed amount of infectivity (in terms of LD 50 doses) had to have been consumed by cattle during the BSE epidemic to generate the particular number of cases seen, regardless of how this infectivity was distributed as a function of incubation stage. This e¡ect should be allowed for in vCJD risk assessments when exploring the e¡ect of di¡erent bovine tissue infectivity assumptions on past levels of human exposure to infectious material. Figure 3c ,d shows the same estimates as ¢gure 3a,b, but calculated under the assumption that all non-reported case carcasses are recyled for MBM. Unlike R 0 estimates, these estimates are very sensitive to this assumption in the case of the six-month infectivity scenario. The reason for this di¡erence in sensitivity is that, for the six-month infectivity scenario, the total number of infectious animals being recycled increases over threefold early in the epidemic, if unreported cases are assumed to be recycled. This lowers the estimate of the transmission coe¤cient, F , and hence the infectivity, since there are now more infectious carcasses available to produce the observed epidemic. Conversely, however, the generation time of the epidemic is relatively una¡ected by the additional infectious carcasses, and since the real-time growth rate of epidemic is also ¢xed (being given by the case data), estimates of R 0 must remain relatively unchanged. This is because the R 0 is essentially given by the product of the real-time growth rate and the generation time. Figure 3c does show somewhat counter-intuitive behaviour, in that I FF rises from ca. 60 to 250 in 1988 (when underreporting is assumed to fall to zero after BSE was made noti¢able). This tends to suggest that either the underreporting levels estimated by the backcalculation model are unrealistically high (see } 3c), or that only a minority of non-reported case carcasses were in fact recycled. It is for this reason that we have concentrated on presenting results from models which assume no cases are recycled for MBM.
(c) Origins and underreporting
The BSE case database on which the preceding analysis is based reveals a case epidemic appearing`from nowhere' in 1986. It is inevitable, therefore, that models which do not explicitly include an origin term, yet describe the recycling process, will inevitably break down in trying to explain the origin of the epidemic (even if the signi¢cant levels of underreporting which probably occurred in the early 1980s are allowed for). This is re£ected by the observation that our estimates of R 0 diverge to increasingly large values for times prior to 1985 when infectivity is largely restricted to the end of the incubation period (¢gure 4). For the constant infectivity scenario a lack of clear pattern (not shown) re£ects the much shorter`generation time' (period between the infection of one animal and that animal infecting another) of around one year seen under this scenario. A short generation time means that the few cases arising from the 1982 cohort, can, say, be explained as having been generated by infections in the 1981 cohort with R 0 values similar to that seen later in the epidemic. R 0 is automatically zero prior to 1980 due to the assumption used here that r F is zero prior to that time. For the longer (three-to fouryear) generation time of the exponential infectivity model, 1982 cohort infections have to have been largely generated by the very small number of predicted infections in the 1978^1979 cohorts. This results in very large R 0 estimates for the 1980^1982 cohorts. Put another way, the backcalculation model estimates that there were so few infections in the very early cohorts that R 0 would have had to have been very high to allow animals from those cohorts to generate the many more infections seen in later cohorts.
This e¡ect enables us to explore the extent to which di¡ering source terms for BSE might generate values of R 0 that remain relatively constant up to the introduction of the MBM ban. We model possible origins of BSE by considering one additional transmission hazard, Q E (t,a), representing a feed-based risk of infection from aǹ external' sourceöe.g. sheep scrapie or a sporadic spongiform encephalopathy of cattle. Di¡erent forms of such a hazard can represent di¡erent types of origin scenario: a single pulse of infection might represent a single, rarè cross-over' event from sheep scrapie or a non-bovine transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), whilst a constant low-level background risk might represent the e¡ect of some low frequency sporadic TSE of cattle, or some low prevalence strain of scrapie capable of infecting cattle. The model used here is not capable of distinguishing these scenarios, in that a wide range of di¡erent durations of external hazard are capable of generating constant R 0 values early in the epidemicöranging from a single pulse some time between 1974 and 1978 to a continuous background risk from 1974 to the introduction of the MBM ban. Figure 5 shows an example of such a scenario, for a single pulse of infection in 1977. It should be noted that pulses starting post-1980 are unable to generate constant R 0 estimates from 1981^1982 onwards due to the three-to four-year generation time of the epidemic under the exponentially increasing infectivity scenario.
For the 4200 origin scenarios (which sampled a variety of magnitudes, start and stop dates for the external hazard) explored for each infectivity scenario, at least 1500 BSE infections (either caused by the external hazard, or by recycling within the bovine population) were required to have occurred prior to 1980 to produce a constant R 0 pro¢le in the early 1980s. The backcalculation model is therefore only able to maintain its quality of ¢t to the BSE case data by estimating very high levels of underreporting prior to 1986 (before which date no BSE cases were reported). It is open to question as to how reasonable it is to assume that a novel disease would only have been identi¢ed after over 300 cases had occurred (the absolute minimum number obtained in the model runs performed: most runs estimated 1000+ unreported cases prior to 1986), even allowing for the somewhat speculative nature of this analysis (note the very large error bars around the estimates of R 0 in the early phase of the epidemic). That said, it should be noted that only around 70% of BSE cases currently being diagnosed are being con¢rmed through neuropathological examination as BSE. This demonstrates the di¤culties inherent in making a clear diagnosis, and the potential for confusing symptoms with those caused by other (e.g. metabolic) diseases.
Of course, it is clearly possible that changes in the rendering industry or in the spatial distribution of feed in the 1980s did lead to changes in R 0 during the BSE epidemic (as suggested by the as yet unexplained dip in R 0 estimates in 1985^1986). Indeed, it is widely supposed that the changes in rendering practices in the late 1970s (Wilesmith et al. 1991) increased the likelihood that an infectious agent could resist the rendering process. However, such a change would cause R 0 to increase early in the epidemic, and therefore could not produce the rapid drop seen in ¢gure 4a. Moreover, even in the absence of source terms (and irrespective of which infectivity scenario is adopted), previous work has shown that very high levels of underreporting are required to explain the apparently changing age structure of cases in the ¢rst few years of the epidemic. In essence, the average age of onset dropped from around ten years to about six years from the 1980 to the 1984 cohorts, which in the absence of a changing incubation period (and given a narrow age window of high susceptibility^exposure) can only be explained by high levels of underreporting prior to mid-1988.
Given this overall uncertainty, additional research is certainly warranted on how potential changes in the pathogen during the early epidemic might provide an alternative explanation of the observed changing age structure of early cases. In particular, if the BSE epidemic originated from a TSE strain in di¡erent species, we might expect`adaptation' of the pathogen to cattle and a consequent shortening of the incubation period during the ¢rst few generations of infection. Examining changing incubation period hypotheses with backcalculation models poses methodological di¤culties at present, however. The potential for spatially heterogeneous transmission processes (which gave rise to the observed clustering of BSE cases) to in£uence the pattern of the early epidemic also requires exploration. As well as explaining shifting age structure, such mechanisms might then also enable the origin date of the BSE epidemic to be brought forward to as late as 1981^1982, and therefore not require such high levels of underreporting to explain the lack of identi¢ed cases prior to 1986.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper represents the analysis of how the process of recycling bovine tissues in cattle feed gave rise to the BSE epidemic in GB. We have characterized the epidemic process by estimating the basic reproduction number of BSE, R 0 . The usefulness of R 0 as a summary statistic for the transmission dynamics of an infectious agent is well known (Anderson & May 1991) : it characterizes the rate of growth of an epidemic, gives insight into the proportion of the population which will be a¡ected once the disease becomes endemic, and determines the criteria for disease elimination.
We have demonstrated that BSE was a highly infectious agent through the feed-based route of transmission; under the more realistic of the infectivity models explored (infectivity peaking at the end of the incubation period), R 0 9 10^12 prior to the introduction of the ¢rst control measures (the MBM ban) in 1988. This result is within the range estimated by earlier work , and suggests that BSE had the potential to infect over 907 of GB cattle exposed to MBM in feed, had control measures not been introduced. Moreover, our analysis gives insight into the absolute infectiousness of late incubation stage animals, indicating that each such animal must have infected up to 400 other animals in order to produce the epidemic seen. From this perspective, the ruminant feed ban introduced in 1988 (BSE Order 1988) appears to have been relatively successful in rapidly reducing transmission to the point where BSE will inevitably be driven to extinction (R 0 51).
Explicit modelling of the recycling process also allows investigation of possible origins of the BSE epidemic. Our results indicate that the observed case data can be explained by either some constant low-level`external' source of infection over a period of years, or by a single origin event, but that under either scenario over 1500 animals had to have been infected by 1980. Thus, whether this scenario ¢ts the case data is highly dependent on assuming that underreporting of cases was very high early in the epidemic . This result may therefore o¡er circumstantial evidence that changes in the pathogen early in the epidemic may have played a key role in the transmission dynamics of BSE early on.
The one caveat that must be placed on these conclusions is that the models used assume homogeneous mixing and exposure of the GB cattle population. In fact, signi¢-cant clustering of BSE cases was seen. However, clustering by itself is insu¤cient to invalidate our conclusion that BSE will not become endemic (even at a low level) in British cattleöespecially given the very low value of R 0 9 0X15 estimated for 1993. Clustering can arise due to heterogeneities in exposure alone (but with quasi-global mixing of MBM), or heterogeneities in both exposure and transmission. The latter is required before persistence of BSE in some`core' subset of cattle is possible. More speci¢cally, the population dynamics of BSE would have to exhibit a rather extreme metapopulation structure: i.e. subsets of cattle (perhaps characterized by spatial regions) would have to be experiencing largely self-contained epidemics, with only weak interactions between these subsets. Had this been the case, and if the e¡ect of the MBM ban had been to merely reduce the proportion of subsets within which BSE transmission continued, one would expect to have seen an increase in case clustering following the MBM ban. The fact that this cannot detected in the case data ) therefore increases the con¢dence that can be held in conclusions derived from global models. The extent to which analyses of spatial clustering and transmission processes might shed light on the origin of the epidemic remains to be seen, however.
In conclusion, whilst more detailed research into BSE transmission dynamicsöin particular into case clustering patterns and possible changes in the pathogen early in the epidemicöremains of scienti¢c interest, this paper, together with earlier work (Anderson et al. 1996; Donnelly et al. 1997a,b; Ferguson et al. 1997 ) completes a comprehensive analysis of the epidemiology of BSE in GB at the population level. The application of this work to the analysis of vCJD transmission dynamics has been undertaken (Ghani et al. 1998a,b) .
